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The past few decades have witnessed a renewed interest in the theory of 
emotions both in philosophy and psy-
chology. Work in this area has relied 
heavily on certain seventeenth-century 
philosophical theories of emotion (at the 
time variously termed theories of “pas-
sion”, “affect”, or even “action”). I shall 
start this paper by giving a very brief 
overview of the place of emotion theory 
in seventeenth-century art and thought. 
This will be followed by a sketch of two 
seventeenth-century theories of emo-
tion, those of Descartes and Spinoza. I 
shall identify certain ways in which these 
theories have influenced or could (and 
  This article presents the preliminary results of my 
research in the frame of the project “Actuality of En-
lightenment: the Moral Science of Emotions,” which 
was generously supported by the Royal Flemish Acad-
emy of Sciences and Arts (KVAB) in Belgium. I would 
like to express my deep gratitude to Martin Moors, 
who initiated, and Herman De Dijn, who supported 
the project.
 In her   Bericht for the journal Information Philoso-
phie Sabine A. Döring also speaks of Die Renaissance 




This paper takes a look at seventeenth-cen-
tury theories of emotion, and their influence 
on contemporary philosophical and psycho-
logical approaches to the subject. Although at a 
first glance some of these seventeenth-century 
theories may seem to be outdated, this is often 
a result of a simplistic reading, and in fact there 
are promising ways to “update” these theories. 
Reading seventeenth-century theories from our 
own perspective reveals new aspects of the work 
of our predecessors, which, in turn, can inspire 
further contemporary developments. 
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perhaps should) influence our contemporary thinking on the subject. 
In the seventeenth century, a great variety of theories of emotion, implicit and explicit, 
competed for popular recognition. These theories emerged from different aspects or 
layers of culture. One such layer was popular pulp literature with erotic or pornograph-
ic content, which contained rather implicit accounts of emotion. Another was litera-
ture, of different sorts, intended for more sensitive or more educated people. Examples 
are pastoral novels, novels or manuals for courtiers, and plays written and staged for 
the old noble and the new bourgeois by writers like Corneille and Molière. Theatre and 
music, as well as painting, illustrated theories of emotion in a more or less conscious 
manner. Furthermore, some artists attempted to understand certain aspects of their 
own profession through (at least sketches of) theories of emotion. Lodewijk Meijer 
(630-68), who is well-known as a friend of Spinoza, was a theoretician as well as a 
practitioner of the art of theater, and composed dramas displaying the influence of Car-
tesian emotion theory.3 Another example is the official painter of Louis XIV, Charles Le 
Brun (69-690), who gave a Conférence sur l’expression générale et particulière [scil. 
of the passions] (7 April 668), which became the basis of the posthumously published 
Méthode pour apprendre à dessiner les passions (Le Brun, 70).4
At a more theoretical level, earlier theories of emotion, like that of Aristotle’s Rhetoric 
and the Doctor Angelicus’ treatise on emotion in the Prima Secundae (Arts. -48) of 
his Summa Theologiae exerted an influence on education in the “liberal arts”. Certain 
renaissance treatments of the subject, such as J. L. Vivès’ (49-540) De anima et vita 
(538) and J. Lipsius’ (547-606) frequently re-edited De Constantia (584), also had 
remarkable impact. From among authors in the seventeenth century itself, many are 
virtually unknown today to scientists, and even to philosophers not specialized in the 
field of the history of emotion theory. I will only mention a few works from the long 
list: J.-P. Camus’ Traité des passions de l’âme (64), Walther Charleton’s Natural History 
of the Passions (Charleton 674), Nicholas Coeffeteau’s    Tableau des passions humaines, 
de leurs causes et leurs effets (Coeffeteau 60),5 Marin Cureau de la Chambre’s Les 
Charactère des passions (Cureau de la Chambre 640-66), Louis de la Forge’s Traité 
de l’esprit de l’homme (La Forge 666), Antoine Le Grand’s Le sage des Stôiques, ou 
l’homme sans passions, selon les sentiments de Seneque (Le Grand 66), Man Without 
Passion: or, the Wise Stoick, According to the Sentiments of Seneca (Le Grand 675), the 
chapters dedicated to the passions in Nicolas Malebranche’s De la recherche de la vérité 
(Malebranche 675), and writings that contributed to the so-called amour-pur debate,6 
Edward Reynolds’ A Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of the Soul of Man (Reynolds 
640), Jean-Francois Senault’s De l’usage des passions (Senault 64), Thomas Wright’s 
The Passions of the Mind in General (Wright 604).
3  See, for instance, Klever 997, pp. 6-86, Meinsma 983, pp. 94-98.
4  See also Montagu 994, as well as Kirchner 99, Allen 998, Willehad 98.
5  English translation: London, 6.
6  See, for example, Schmaltz 005 and Schmal 005.
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Evidently enough, our own general understanding of seventeenth-century philoso-
phy is not shaped primarily by these authors. The people who exerted a longer lasting 
influence on subsequent intellectual history were those thinkers of early modernity 
who, in some way or another, were wedded to the new scientific ideal of their century: 
mechanical science – the likes of Hobbes, Descartes, Spinoza, Locke or Leibniz. As a 
matter of fact, all these philosophers wrote at least a chapter on the emotions. Until 
recently, however, these treatises and chapters were mostly treated as casual writings, 
falling outside their authors’ main philosophical arguments. Anthony Kenny, one of the 
first to break with this tradition, gives the following diagnosis of this situation:
Research has been centred on the contemplative rather than the active, on the 
intellectual rather than the emotional and voluntary aspects of human life. 
Knowledge rather than action, belief rather than emotion, the intellect rather 
than the will have been the central topics of philosophical concern. (Kenny 
963, p. )
The theory of emotions had seemed to be neglected in other disciplines as well, for 
example in neuroscience. J. Panksepp, for instance, argues that behaviorism in psy-
chology for a long time prevented his science from investigating emotions in a more 
thorough and philosophical manner:
Unfortunately, the neuroscientific approach remains poorly developed 
partially because of the insidious influence of a simpleminded ‘behaviorism’ 
that inhibited psychoneurological thought during the middle of this century. 
(Panksepp 997, p.  )
Despite the obstacles both in philosophy and psychology, in the past three decades, 
enormous progress has been made by the joint enterprise of emotion research. Some 
of the recently published books are historical in character, e.g., the pioneering book 
of Susan James, Passion and Action. The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy 
(James 997), Denis Kambouchner’s masterful commentary on Descartes: L’Homme 
des passions: Commentaires sur Descartes (Kambouchner 996), and the volume The 
Soft Underbelly of Reason: The Passions in the Seventeenth Century, edited by Stephen 
Gaukroger (Gaukroger 998). Other works embark on original, systematic investiga-
tion. Examples are Robert Solomon’s The Passions (Solomon 977), Ronald de Sousa’s 
The Rationality of Emotions (de Sousa 987), Paul Ekman’s publications from 969 on-
wards,7 the Handbook of Emotions by Michael Lewis and Jeannette Haviland (Lewis & 
Haviland 993), Nico Frijda’s The Emotions (Frijda 986), and Understanding Emotions 
by Keith Oatley and Jennifer M. Jenkins (Oatley & Jenkins 996). What perhaps comes 
to mind first, however, are two books by Antonio Damasio that amply illustrate the 
interdisciplinary character of emotion research: Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason and 
7 For instance, Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth 97�� Ekman 98.         
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the Human Brain (Damasio 994) and Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling 
Brain (Damasio 003).
In what follows I shall focus on those aspects of systematic research into the emo-
tions that can be linked to seventeenth-century theories, specifically, to the work of 
Descartes and Spinoza, the two authors who exerted the greatest influence on contem-
porary theories. First, I shall present the accounts of Descartes and Spinoza in broad 
outline. Second, I will suggest ways in which the two accounts proceed along similar 
lines as (and could potentially contribute to) contemporary discussions. Third, I will 
look at Damasio’s Descartes and Spinoza.
* * *
Descartes’ The Passions of the Soul, published in 649, is a masterpiece of philosophia 
aulica: Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia as well as Queen Christina of Sweden were 
among those who urged Descartes to write a treatise on the subject. This fact might 
contribute to an explanation of one of the peculiarities of this work: that instead of 
settling questions concerning Descartes’s philosophy – most of all, concerning mind-
body dualism8 – it opens up a whole new field of debate. In his pioneering metaphysical 
investigations—the Meditations on First Philosophy and the Principles of Philosophy, 
especially parts -—Descartes puts forward a new system based on two kinds of sub-
stance, res cogitans and res extensa, each of which can in principle exist independently 
of the other’s support. In contrast, in the treatise on the passions, he seems to advocate 
what we might call a strange sort of “influxus psycho-physicus”. On the one hand, we 
have an account of the human body: a system of nerves filled with extremely fine bits of 
matter—misleadingly called “animal spirits”— and the brain with the so-called “pineal 
gland” in its centre, suspended by an extremely fine thread. Descartes maintains that 
human as well as animal bodies function naturally, i.e., react to certain stimuli in the 
appropriate way, without any recourse to non-bodily processes. On the other hand, 
humans, unlike animals, also have bon sens or bona mens. That is, the mind, just like 
the body, has its own default settings that enable proper functioning, which, in the 
case of the mind, is the appropriate use of reason. At the same time, what distinguishes 
humans from beasts (and other, natural or artificial, “machines”) is the mind’s phe-
nomenally attested capacity to interfere with the body’s natural mechanisms. However, 
if this is so, the following question can hardly be avoided: if the thinking thing and the 
extended thing are separate substances, how is this interference and battle between 
the (rational) soul and the mechanical body possible? As part of the answer Descartes 
has recourse to a sort of artifice, where the fine thread that is supposed to keep the 
pineal gland in balance has a crucial role: it enables the soul to influence some of the 
bodily reactions to bodily stimuli, that is, to re-arrange—at least some of—the original 
connections established by nature between sense perception and action. Having thus 
8  See Garber & Wilson 998. I cannot attempt here to assess this problem in general. 
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introduced a quasi-mechanical artifice to bridge the metaphysical gap between mind 
and body, Descartes could define the passions as follows:
After having considered in what respects the passions of the soul differ from all 
its other thoughts, it seems to me that we may define them generally as those 
perceptions, sensations or emotions of the soul which we refer particularly to 
it, and which are caused, maintained and strengthened by some movement of 
the spirits.9
Without dwelling at length on the antecedents and consequents of this definition,0 I 
would like to stress the fact that, due to his concern with physics and physiology, Des-
cartes found it necessary to supplement traditional and popular treatments of emotion 
by a “mechanical” foundation for the phenomenal part of the theory. And even if this 
foundation turned out to be inadequate in the light of discoveries by modern neuro-
science, it must be kept in mind that it was Descartes who laid the foundation for the 
methodological self-understanding of all the sciences of the brain, from neurophysiol-
ogy via psychology, to research in artificial intelligence. One feature of his work that 
is very significant from a contemporary scientific perspective is that he deliberately 
breaks with the previously influential moral-theological approaches—which had had a 
tendency to evaluate emotions negatively—and advocates a value-free enquiry. In the 
short letter preceding The Passions of the Soul, Descartes writes:
I have changed nothing in the style, whose simplicity and brevity will reveal 
that my intention was to explain the passions only as a natural philosopher [en 
physicien], and not as a rhetorician or even as a moral philosopher.
This point offers an interesting comparison with Spinoza. Spinoza shares the Cartesian 
ideal of value-neutral enquiry, even if, as we shall see in a moment, his methodological 
conception is somewhat different. In the preface to the third book of his Ethics he sums 
up the sine ira et studio methodology of his subsequent treatment of affects as follows.
For now I wish to return to those who prefer to curse or laugh at the Affects 
and actions of men, rather than understand them. To them it will doubtless 
seem strange that I should undertake to treat men’s vices and absurdities in the 
Geometric style, and that I should wish to demonstrate by certain reasoning 
things which are contrary to reason, and which they proclaim to be empty, 
absurd, and horrible. […]
The Affects, therefore, of hate, anger, envy, etc., considered in themselves, 
follow from the same necessity and force of nature as the other singular 
things. And therefore they acknowledge certain causes, through which they 
9  Art. 7: Descartes 985, p. 338.
0 See Kambouchner 996.   
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are understood, and have certain properties, as worthy of our knowledge as 
the properties of any other thing, by the mere contemplation of which we are 
pleased. Therefore, I shall treat the nature and powers of the Affects, and the 
power of the Mind over them, by the same Method by which, in the preceding 
parts, I treated God and the Mind, and I shall consider human actions and 
appetites just as if it were a Question of lines, planes, and bodies.
Though both Descartes and Spinoza advocate a value-neutral enquiry, there is an im-
portant difference between them, as can be seen also from this quotation: while the 
Cartesian theory was modeled primarily on physics, Spinoza’s approach is modeled on 
geometry. This difference is also responsible for their parting company when it comes 
to the mind-body relation. When Spinoza claims in the preface to the fifth book that 
“this gland is not found to be so placed in the middle of the brain that it can be driven 
about so easily and in so many ways, and that not all the nerves extend to the cavities of 
the brain”, this “experimental” refusal of Descartes’ theory does not yet reveal the depth 
of their disagreement. Nor does the following explication, which, nevertheless, brings 
us closer to the real theoretical issue: 
And of course, since there is no common measure between the will and 
motion, there is also no comparison between the power, or forces, of the Mind 
and those of the Body. Consequently, the forces of the Body cannot in any way 
be determined by those of the Mind.
However convincing this argument is, there is a further issue that lies at the bottom of 
the disagreement between Descartes and Spinoza. Geometry does not call for anything 
really extended in the explanation for the connection between thinking and extension, 
a connection which exists despite their distinct nature. For the philosopher as geom-
eter places that difference at the level of the attributes, not at the level of substance. Just 
like figures mirroring each other on the two sides of an axis, mind and body have their 
own identities and differences, and the explanation for their relationship does not need 
special reference to either of the two (in contrast with Descartes’ “extremely fine” form 
of real extension). 
However, overestimating the methodological difference between Descartes and Spi-
noza would be just as wrong as underestimating the difference between their theories 
of emotion. For both of them admired the Elements of Euclid, and they both tried to 
follow the Euclidean model in their accounts of the emotions. They both begin with 
a set of elementary passions or affects and derive all the rest from these “primitives”. 
Descartes enumerates six such passions: wonder, desire, joy, sadness, love and hatred. 
Spinoza’s system has a more “elementary” character: he acknowledges only the three 
  Spinoza 985 (“Curley”), p. 49.
  See Jaquet 00.
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basic affects of desire, joy and sadness�� with desire having a special role to play, in that 
it accompanies all the derivative affects of both joy and sadness.
I cannot venture to present here in detail Descartes’ and Spinoza’s description of the 
emergence and most significant properties of the particular emotions. What I would 
like to do instead is to proceed to explore certain links between seventeenth-century 
accounts and emotion theories today. Having accomplished this, I will look at Dama-
sio’s proposed synthesis between neuroscience and early modern philosophy.
First, let me return to a point I have already mentioned: that it was Descartes who 
developed the first type of neuroscience, in the form of neuromechanics. In their Un-
derstanding Emotion—an excellent work in other respects—Oatley and Jenkins, despite 
otherwise acknowledging Descartes’ merits, set up a straw man in their reconstruction 
of Descartes’ odd mechanical story of the sense-action connection via animal spirits 
and the pineal gland. A different interpretation and, in my view, a most promising 
treatment of the issue can be found in a book and an important study by John Sutton. 
“‘[T]he Cartesian legacy,’” Sutton quotes, “‘has furnished contemporary thinking with 
a paradigm of the body as an inert, closed, and anonymous object.’”3 “But in fact,” he 
continues in his own voice: 
as Malebranche puts it in introducing his account of the passions, the Cartesian 
view of the body implies that ‘we are to some extent joined to the entire 
universe’ […] It takes revision of received wisdom to find room in Cartesianism 
for the picture of highly theorized, porous, particular bodies as temporary 
pockets of stability embedded in social and physical worlds. (Sutton 998a,  
p. 5, italics are added) 
It is precisely this “revision” that Sutton undertakes in his book Sutton 998b, to the 
effect that 
[t]he resulting orientation renders less surprising the notion of distributed 
memories, always in motion, never stored passively and faithfully in inert cells 
in a memory palace, but superimposed and reconstructed according to the 
peculiarities of history and current context. (Sutton 998a, p. 5) 
Sutton 998a (where the above quotation come from) connects the theme of the emo-
tions to the author’s novel interpretation of the ways in which animal spirits and the 
brain function in memory storage processes.
Let us move now from the issues concerning different models of “hard-wiring” to the 
question of how to define emotions at a more abstract level. Oatley and Jenkins base 
their tripartite definition on Nico Frijda’s conception in The Emotions. In the first part 
3  This is in fact a quotation from a call for papers issued by Steve Burwood and Gill Jagger for a conference on 
Body Matters.
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they deal with the causal prerequisites of the emotions, in the second with their moti-
vational force, while in the third with emotions’ presence in the mind as mental states.4 
An emotion arises when a person perceives an event as relevant to something that is sa-
lient for her. The emotion will be positive if the event favours the valued thing�� negative 
if it hinders its realization. Now, it seems obvious that seventeenth-century thinkers 
would welcome this as part of a general definition of emotion. For example, Thomas 
Hobbes in Chapter 6 of his Leviathan (E 65 / L 668), having explained that the way 
we get influenced by bodies in the outer world is sensing them and that what remains 
after sensation is “fancy”, introduces the concept of “small beginnings” of voluntary 
motion that follow upon the “fancy” of an object or event retained in “imagination”. As 
he explains:
These small beginnings of motion within the body of man before they appear 
in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions, are commonly called 
Endeavour. This endeavour, when it is toward something which causes it, 
is called Appetite or Desire […] And when the endeavour is fromward 
something, it is generally called Aversion. These words, appetite and aversion, 
we have from the Latin, and they both of them signify the motions, one of 
approaching, the other of retiring. (Hobbes 994, 7 ff.) 
So voluntary motions are elicited by a memory trace of an event that we deem to help 
or to hinder the realization of what we think important for us. 
Locke (and also Leibniz) concurs. It is also interesting to compare here the carefully  
crafted foundations of Spinoza’s systematic theory of emotion with the second part of 
the contemporary definition cited above. For Spinoza, desire is the general motivational 
force behind all emotions, prior to the distinction of what he terms “joy” and “sadness”. 
The importance of desire is much greater than that of any particular emotion. Desires 
are the genera of all emotions, as it were, and it is in them that elementary conscious-
ness of both ourselves and of the objects affecting us is articulated.5 
This characteristic of Spinoza’s theory links up with the second and third aspects of an 
emotion in the theory advocated by Frijda, Oatley and Jenkins. The second aspect is the 
capacity of the emotions to trigger action-readiness and direct action towards some-
thing to which the emotion attributes the character of urgency, while the third is that 
emotions are experienced as mental states of a particular type, sometimes accompanied 
by bodily changes. Spinozean desire can perfectly well be interpreted as something that 
triggers action-readiness, and as a kind of mental state in which we experience our-
selves, and the objects affecting us, in a special way.
4 Oatley & Jenkins 996, ch. 4.      
5 See the definitions and explications of desire in         The Ethics Book 3, Prop. 9 and the first of the “Definitions of 
Affects”.
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Besides defining emotion, a further general issue in emotion theory today is that of the 
so-called “basic emotions”. The notion itself is controversial and unclear, since we might 
attach different senses to the word “basic”. Paul Ekman hoped to identify emotions 
which – together with their associated facial expressions – can be found universally. 
Robert Solomon (Solomon 003, pp. 5-4) examines several other meanings of the 
term.6 Let me mention a further meaning which is employed by most neuroscientists: 
“basic” as meaning “hard-wired in the brain”. Perhaps the most renowned partisan of 
this view is Jaak Panksepp.7 Concerning the biological basis of emotions, Panksepp 
maintains that “genes are not just passive repositories of ancestral knowledge, but dy-
namically responsive information stores”. He claims that “many developmental chang-
es” we “may be genetically prepared to believe” to be due to “environmental events” are 
as much to be attributed to “the epigenetic unfolding of hereditary tendencies stored 
within DNA. The brain is full of special and general-purpose mechanisms that have 
been constructed through evolutionary reinforcement. At least in rough outline, the 
basic emotions are such entities” (Ekman & Davidson 994, p.). Panksepp then pro-
ceeds to present an even bolder approach: whatever items are on the different lists of al-
legedly basic emotions, “the cardinal neuroscientific issue is whether there are common 
principles among the underlying circuit functions of the brain that should encourage 
us to place only certain items in the same category” (Ekman & Davidson 994, p. ). 
The answer is immediately given in the guise of a “useful starting point”: basic emo-
tions are “at least in part” to be defined “with respect to neural circuit characteristics”. 
Panksepp thinks “it is reasonable to view basic emotions as arising from coherent brain 
operating systems that have a considerable number of shared neural characteristics”. 
One candidate characteristic is the capacity to “orchestrate and coordinate a large num-
ber of output systems in response to specific inputs”�� another is the capacity to “gener-
ate characteristic internal feeling states” (Ekman & Davidson 994, 3 ff.).
Such a radically scientific-minded characterization of basic emotions—its starting-
point not being a phenomenological description of the common subjective experience 
of everyday emotions, but neuroscientific experiments revealing processes that are not, 
as such, accessible to subjective experience—is not at all alien to seventeenth-century 
thinking. We may safely assume that Descartes, who himself practised or at least did 
not object to the vivisection of animals, would be intensely interested in contemporary 
neurophysiological research. He would most probably find the description of the way 
in which basic emotion processes are, at least in part, genetically pre-given and defined 
“with respect to neural circuit characteristics” congenial to his own idea that certain 
passionate reactions to particular kinds of input are operated in us by nature. Consider, 
for example the following passage from The Passions of the Soul:
6  See also Ekman & Davidson 994, esp. pp. 5-47: “Question : Are There Basic Emotions?”.
7  See his contributions to Ekman & Davidson 994.
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I explained in the Optics how the objects of sight make themselves known to 
us simply by producing, through the medium of the intervening transparent 
bodies, local motions in the optic nerve-fibres at the back of our eyes, and 
then in the regions of the brain where these nerves originate. I explained too 
that the objects produce as much variety in these motions as they cause us 
to see in the things, and that it is not the motions occurring in the eye, but 
those occurring in the brain, which directly represent these objects to the soul. 
By this example, it is easy to conceive how sounds, smells, tastes, heat, pain, 
hunger, thirst and, in general, all the objects both of our external senses and 
of our internal appetites, also produce some movement in our nerves, which 
passes through them into the brain. Besides causing our soul to have various 
different sensations, these various movements in the brain can also act without 
the soul, causing the spirits to make their way to certain muscles rather than 
others, and so causing them to move our limbs. (Art. 3) 
There are other passages which identify the encoding behind these bodily processes 
as a certain “activity” of “nature.” The idea is directly applied to the functioning of the 
emotions, that is, the passions in the narrow sense:
For the movement of the gland, whereby the spirits are driven to the optic 
nerve in the way required for enlarging or contracting the pupils, has been 
joined by nature with the volition to look at distant or nearby objects, rather 
than with the volition to enlarge or contract the pupils. (Art. 44)
[R]epulsion is ordained by nature to represent to the soul a sudden and 
unexpected death. (Art. 89)
[T]he principal attraction comes from the perfections we imagine in a person 
who we think capable of becoming a second self. For nature has established a 
difference of sex in human beings, as in animals lacking reason, and with this 
she has also implanted certain impressions in the brain which bring it about 
that at a certain age and time we regard ourselves as deficient – as forming 
only one half of a whole, whose other half must be a person of the opposite 
sex. In this way nature represents, in a confused manner, the acquisition of 
this other half as the greatest of all goods imaginable. Although we see many 
persons of the opposite sex, yet we do not desire many at any one time, since 
nature does not make us imagine that we need more than one other half. But 
when we observe something in one of them which is more attractive than 
anything we observe at that moment in the others, this determines our soul to 
feel towards that one alone all the inclination which nature gives it to pursue 
the good which it represents as the greatest we could possibly possess. (Art. 
90�� all italics are added)
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It seems to me that Descartes’ description of how sensory impulses travel in the nerves 
does not differ in principle – i.e. in its philosophical outlook – from Panksepp’s idea in 
the following passage. Panksepp considers a 
minimalist example – the genetically ingrained tendency of a rat to exhibit 
fear in response to the smell of a cat. The information comes in via the 
vomeronasal nerve, which, after passing through the accessory olfactory bulb, 
synapses largely in the preoptic area and medial amygdale. From the medial 
amygdale, the information travels largely via the stria terminalis to the anterior 
hypothalamus, where the information appears to be further integrated with 
fear command circuitry, which then descends to the periventricular gray 
[…] At no point in this flow did the fearful smell have to be processed by 
thalamo-cortical systems [i.e. no cognitive processes are to be involved] […] 
In a similar way, sounds can provoke fear with no cortical processing. (Ekman 
& Davidson 994, 5 f.)
At the same time, I do see an interesting difference between the two authors’ attitudes 
towards the values involved in the emotion processes described. Each of them pres-
ents a complex position. Panksepp urges “the disciplines concerned with the objective 
behavior of animals” to take seriously the issue of “internal biological values,” without 
which he doubts “if any credible model of behavior could ever be generated” (Ekman 
& Davidson 994, p. 4). In this, he is in agreement with the Dutch biologist Frans B. 
M. De Waal.8 De Waal’s main concern is that although his discipline, i.e., evolution-
ary biology, undeniably takes the issue of moral values seriously, it is still on the wrong 
track, one that is at odds with Darwin’s original insights, as well as with facts concern-
ing the behavior of primates. De Waal’s problem is that leading biologists, following 
Thomas Henry Huxley, dispute that moral values emerge from evolution. Instead, they 
endorse the view that all morality is created by culture against the evolution-based 
and genetic instinctive selfishness of our pure biological being. De Waal argues that in 
The Descent of Man (87) Darwin himself “unequivocally stressed morality as part of 
human nature” (De Waal 005, p. 7). Darwin recognized that promoting self-serving 
behavior “by no means precludes the evolution of altruistic and sympathetic tenden-
cies” and he “emphasized continuity with animals even in the moral domain” (De Waal 
005, p. ). 
The likely origin of this emphasis on sympathy is to be found in the work of David 
Hume and Adam Smith. For this reason, one could argue that Darwin was inspired by 
his a priori philosophical predilections rather than by a posteriori experiments. Never-
theless, contemporary experimental research also seems to support his thesis. De Waal 
uses the expression “emotional contagion” to refer to what happens when, in the case 
of one-year old children, household pets, and primates living wild, “the emotional state 
8  I rely here on De Waal 005.
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of one individual induces a matching or related state in another” (De Waal 005, p. 6). 
This he considers the first layer in his “Russian Doll Model,” which is meant to show 
how conscious forms of empathy with a cognitive, cultural, and social basis develop 
not against “this firm, hard-wired basis” of “automatic emotional impact,” but rather 
on top of this (De Waal 005, p. 3). Thus, the—in itself value-neutral—investigation 
of the basic conditions of our bios exposed the primitive value of others in the form of 
the phenomenon of emotional contagion. This seems to involve a sort of teleology that 
does not, however, leave behind the realm of natural evolution:
Inasmuch as the survival of many animals depends on concerted action, 
mutual aid, and information transfer, selection must have favored proximate 
mechanisms to evaluate the emotional states of others and quickly respond to 
them in adaptive ways. (De Waal 005, p. 3)
Returning to Descartes now, we find that his promise of investigating the passions en 
physician certainly does not mean leaving aside all considerations concerning values 
within nature. As it is clear from the text of the Meditations on First Philosophy—and 
as I have argued in Boros 005—the concept of nature is as ambivalent as other main 
concepts in Descartes’ philosophy. On the one hand, in early works such as The World 
nature seems to be a self-contained system of drives and principles of a (proto-)evolu-
tion, including those related to the development of human beings. In the Meditations, 
on the other hand, we encounter a different concept of nature: 
Indeed, there is no doubt that everything that I am taught by nature contains 
some truth. For if nature is considered in its general aspect, then I understand 
by the term nothing other than God himself, or the ordered system of created 
things established by God. And by my own nature in particular I understand 
nothing other than the totality of things bestowed on me by God. (CSM ,  
p. 56) 
An interesting alternative to this view is an episode of the sceptical argument of the 
first meditation, which offers a glimpse of an Epicurean-evolutionary idea of nature 
– without a God-creator.
Perhaps there may be some who would prefer to deny the existence of so 
powerful a God rather than believe that everything else is uncertain. Let us not 
argue with them, but grant them that everything said about God is a fiction. 
According to their supposition, then, I have arrived at my present state by fate 
or chance or a continuous chain of events, or by some other means�� yet since 
deception and error seem to be imperfections, the less powerful they make my 
original cause, the more likely it is that I am so imperfect as to be deceived all 
the time. (CSM , p. 4) 
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What can we say now, in the light of this ambiguity, about the operative nature in the 
previous quotations from The Passions of the Soul? It seems clear that it is the God-cre-
ated nature that is at work there�� and if it is God behind nature establishing epistemo-
logical values in the form of a “good sense”, why would He refrain from granting basic 
moral values in the form a good will? Thus, Cartesian nature, in the final analysis, is 
not free of positive values, and the path of these values leads us beyond pure nature, to 
her transcendent creator and maintainer. Unlike De Waal’s, Descartes’ teleology is not 
inherent in nature.
In contrast, we can make perfect sense of the modern idea of emotional contagion in 
the context of Spinoza’s Ethics (677). In Proposition 7 of Book 3, Spinoza anticipates 
the idea promoted by De Waal and Hatfield and others (Hatfield, Cacioppo & Rapson 
994). Spinoza claims that:
[i]f we imagine a thing like us, toward which we have had no affect, to be 
affected with some affect, we are thereby affected with a like affect. (Curley p. 
508) 
The demonstration provides further explanation:
The images of things are affections of the human Body whose ideas represent 
external bodies as present to us (by IIP7S), i.e. (by IIP6), whose ideas involve 
the nature of our Body and at the same time the present nature of the external 
body. So if the nature of the external body is like the nature of our Body, then 
the idea of the external body we imagine will involve an affection of our Body 
like the affection of the external body. Consequently, if we imagine someone 
like us to be affected with some affect, this imagination will express an affection 
of our Body like this affect. And so, from the fact that we imagine a thing like 
us to be affected with an affect, we are affected with a like affect. But if we hate 
a thing like us, then (by P3) we shall be affected with an affect contrary to its 
affect, not like it, q.e.d.
De Waal’s Russian Doll Model can also be elaborated in a Spinozean manner. The above 
imitation of affect involves but a minimum of cognitive activity, which is at the most 
fundamental level of empathy. The next level is reached in propositions  to 4. Here, 
Spinoza speaks of a transfer of affect in cases where the subject is already “tuned up” 
emotionally, that is, loves or hates the thing in question:
He who imagines what he loves to be affected with Joy or Sadness will also be 
affected with Joy or Sadness�� and each of those affects will be greater or lesser 
in the lover as they are greater or lesser in the thing loved. (Prop. )
Spinoza also mentions the opposite case, in which the subject hates another person, 
and so finds joy in her grief. This apparently contradicts, rather than follows, the Rus-
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sian Doll Model: the second level does not seem to contain the first. But Spinoza adds 
a remark to proposition 3, reminding the reader that “this Joy can hardly be enduring 
and without any conflict of mind. For (as I shall show immediately in P7) insofar as 
one imagines a thing like oneself to be affected with an affect of Sadness, one must be 
saddened. And the opposite, if one imagines the same thing to be affected with Joy”. 
Thus, the second level conforms to the first even in these cases. 
As we have seen, on the second level, the subject can be tuned up through, in Spinoza’s 
sense, “inadequate ideas”. On the third level, in turn, there is no more space for hatred: 
even if we are afflicted by some wrong-doing, the hatred that arises from this is “to be 
conquered by love, or generosity, not by repaying it with Hate in return”. This threefold 
scheme of natural empathy could be extended to various human social formations�� 
but it is not my task here to develop the theme in that direction. The moral I would 
like to draw from these comparisons is that Spinoza elaborated on an idea of teleology, 
without a transcendental creator and maintainer of a telos, which seems closer to what 
contemporary neuroscientists and biologists either call for, or practice, in a new form. 
Jonathan Israel might even have been right when collecting the scattered evidence of 
Spinoza’s clandestine influence, which may have resulted in a not very specific effect 
upon the developing scientific thinking (Israel 00).
Approaching the end of this paper, I would like to turn briefly to Damasio’s under-
standing of seventeenth-century thinkers. I do not want to dwell on Spinoza, whom 
Damasio interpreted as correcting the erroneous ideas of Descartes, since I am always 
glad to see Spinoza’s philosophy employed in the service of helping humankind ap-
proach its unattainable end of perfection. So I will confine myself to some thoughts 
concerning Descartes’ Error, the main thesis of which is that the pure or high rationalist 
view of human activity Descartes was committed to by his rigid dualism of mind and 
body inevitably leads to socio- and psychopathological consequences, as it ignores the 
bodily emotions and feelings that are largely responsible for decision making.
Tom Sorell’s recent book (Sorell 005) contains a short, but well-argued and convincing 
chapter on “Damasio’s Error” (pp. 4-6), which lays bare some crucial incoheren-
cies and non sequitur in Damasio’s use of the case studies meant to support his thesis. 
“My own view,” Sorell concludes, 
is that the class of cases Damasio constructs [in chapter 4 of his book] does 
not display enough of a common pattern, and that he never establishes that 
brain damage affects decision making by way of emotional damage. […] 
Damasio seems to me to maintain coherence among very different cases […] 
only by correlating a fairly constant kind of brain damage with a very vaguely 
described kind of behavioural failing – bad decision making. (Sorell 005,  
p. 0) 
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It seems that Damasio fails to differentiate between metaphysical theses and physiologi-
cal explanations in Descartes—in fact, he ignores the latter. Further, he denounces rath-
er than argues against rationalism in decision making. He links to rationalism not only 
irresolution in such trivial matters as choosing between two dates for an appointment, 
but also to cold-blooded serial killing, without adequate argument. This view strikes 
many of us as extreme. At the other extreme, we may imagine what would happen to 
someone who took positive and negative somatic influences to be automatic clues to a 
good decision. 
Damasio’s views are not as far from those of Descartes as he seems to think, however. 
He puts forward the idea of a “feeling of being” and a hypothesis on the role of what he 
terms “somatic marker”. Damasio posits a sort of uneasiness, Unbehagen, a gut-feeling 
reflecting the overall state of our bodies, which works towards the settling of problems. 
Now if we take seriously what Descartes says about the decisive difference between hu-
man-like machines and real human beings in the fifth part of his Discourse on Method, 
we have to come to the conclusion that on his view, there must be something in real hu-
mans that functions similarly to Damasio’s feeling of being and somatic marker. Let me 
quote two passages from Discourse 5. The first quote exposes the futility of all attempts 
to present the pure mind as wholly separate from the body in Descartes:
[I]t is not sufficient for it [the human soul] to be lodged in the human body 
like a helmsman in his ship, except perhaps to move its limbs, but that it must 
be more closely joined and united with the body in order to have, besides this 
power of movement, feelings and appetites like ours and so constitute a real 
man. (CSM  p. 4)
Another crucial passage in which the difference between “real men” and human-like 
automata is at least hinted at is the following:
The first is that they could never use words, or put together other signs, as we 
do in order to declare our thoughts to others. For we can certainly conceive 
of a machine so constructed that it utters words, and even utters words which 
correspond to bodily actions causing a change in its organs (e.g. if you touch it 
in one spot it asks what you want of it, if you touch it in another it cries out that 
you are hurting it, and so on). But it is not conceivable that such a machine 
should produce different arrangements of words so as to give an appropriately 
meaningful answer to whatever is said in its presence, as the dullest of men 
can do. Secondly, even though such machines might do some things as well as 
we do them, or perhaps even better, they would inevitably fail in others, which 
would reveal that they were acting not through understanding but only from 
the disposition of their organs. For whereas reason is a universal instrument 
which can be used in all kinds of situations, these organs need some particular 
disposition for each particular action�� hence it is for all practical purposes 
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impossible for a machine to have enough different organs to make it act in all 
the contingencies of life in the way in which our reason makes us act. (CSM 
, p. 39)
Now we can see that Damasio argues against a straw man when he suggests that Des-
cartes’ man is not a real human being, but at best a well-programmed mind-machine. 
Real men’s real reason must essentially have the flexibility to find the right answers and 
identify the right behavior in unpredictable situations. In order for appropriate reac-
tions to be possible, reason must also have the ability to control the situations in which 
real men find themselves. Imaginary men with no limitations and actually existing, 
essentially finite humans equally need such an “organ” of flexibility. But the latter also 
have constraints on the set of available alternatives in any given situation. As the very 
last sentence of the Meditations shows, Descartes was well aware of this:
But since the pressure of things to be done does not always allow us to stop 
and make such a meticulous check, it must be admitted that in this human 
life we are often liable to make mistakes about particular things, and we must 
acknowledge the weakness of our nature. (CSM , p. 6)
It is the responsibility of the will to decide even when there are no invincible arguments 
at its disposal. We could hardly find better providers of assistance with this than the 
various passions Descartes explores in The Passions of the Soul.
It was not my intention to offer a comprehensive survey of all the forms of exchange 
between contemporary theorists of emotion and seventeenth-century thinkers. Rather, 
I picked up some threads that can guide us in our thinking of the relationship between 
theories of the two periods. I hope I have offered some reason to think that an exchange 
between early modern philosophy and contemporary philosophical and scientific ap-
proaches to the theme of the emotions can be fruitful not only from the point of view 
of the historian, but also from that of the philosopher.
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